TRANSNATIONAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT
JORDAN J. PAUST*

I
INTRODUCTION

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was
signed in Helsinki, Finland, on August 1, 1975.1 However, as explained in a previous article, several international legal documents had already formally acknowledged both the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the necessarily
interrelated right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers. ' '2 Thus, by the time the Final Act was signed, a
human right to participate in transnational freedom of speech had, in fact, already
3
been widely documented.
The Final Act of the Helsinki conference recognized these developments in
human rights law. In principle VII of the Final Act, the participating states reaffirmed their obligation in connection with "human rights and fundamental freedoms" to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' 4 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the document that first expressly recCopyright © 1982 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B. (1965),J.D. (1968), U.C.L.A.; LL.M. (1972), University of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale University.
1. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1975 [hereinafter cited as
Final Act], reprintedin 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975), in 14 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1292 (1975), andin 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575 (1980).
2. Paust, InternationalLaw and Control of the Media. Terror, Repression and the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621
(1978). The article also surveys global trends in governmental repression of many of the human rights
noted below. See id. at 631-62 and authorities cited therein.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration]. On this point, see also Paust, supra note 2, at 625-26, 629-3 1.
With regard to the presently accepted legal nature and utility of the Universal Declaration, see also M.
McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274, 302, 325-26
parsim (1980); Dimitrijevi6, The Place ofHelsinki on the Long Road to Human Rights, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 253, 268 (1980); Nafziger, The FinalAct of the Helsinki Conference- An Artists'LiberationMovement or a Voyage
to Laputa?, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1977); Paust, supra note 2, at 625 n.23; Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian Prisonersby the United States Government, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
67, 70 n. 13 (1979); Turack, A BriefReview of the Provisions in Recent Agreements ConcerningFreedom ofMovement
Issues in the Modern World,. 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 (1979) (citing A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 27-28 (1972)); Paust, Human Rights." Fromjuri pnudentialInquiy to E.ctive Litigation
(Book Review), 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 228, 230, 233-41, 244 (1981); see also Cassese, The Approach of the
Helsinki Declaration to Human Rights, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 277 (1980) and infta notes 87, 89.
4. Relevant articles of the Charter include articles 1, 55 and 56. See, e.g., Paust,supra note 2, at 625. It
is significant that the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are cited together, for it
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ognized a transnational freedom of speech which it characterized as the receiving
and imparting of information and ideas "regardless of frontiers." 5 Principle VII
also declared that the participating states "[would] also fulfill their obligations as
set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including
'6
inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights."
More specifically, principle VII reaffirmed the obligation of the participating
states to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion." '7 It also confirmed "the right of the individual to know and
act upon his rights and duties in this field," 8 and expressly recognized "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 9 The Helsinki
Final Act contains, as well, an important set of agreements concerning transnational "human contacts" 10 and "the freer and wider dissemination of information." 1 1 These are found within a section of the Act entitled "Co-operation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields," more commonly referred to as "Basket III."
Despite the fact that the Helsinki Final Act stands as an important recognition
or reaffirmation of several aspects of human rights law, doubt has been raised concerning its proper use as an international instrument during present and future
is now widely recognized that the Universal Declaration provides, at a minimum, the legally relevant
content of the human rights guaranteed to all by the UN Charter. See supra note 3.
5. See supra note 3.
6. Those covenants include the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, approved by G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Soviet Union and several
East European countries ratified this treaty in 1976, some nine months after the Helsinki Final Act. For
evidence of such ratifications, see Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions, ST/LEG/SER. D./13, at 111-12 (ratifications of the International Covenant
as of 31 Dec. 1979). The United States signed the Covenant on Oct. 5, 1977. See 77 DEP'T STATE BULL.
578 (1977). Although it has not yet been ratified by the United States, the United States is obligated to
take no action that will adversely affect the major purposes of the Covenant: the protection and enjoyment
of fundamental human rights. For evidence of such an obligation upon the signing of a treaty, see, e.g.,
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, at 291, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39 (1969).
7. As explained above, this obligation and the correlative recognition of the rights of all individuals to
a transnational freedom of opinion and expression is widely documented. See supra note 3. Moreover,
unlike principle VII of the Final Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also expressly prohibits
any distinction on the basis of "colour, . . . political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status" as such. Universal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2.
8. Although the language "know and act upon his rights" is new, it seems merely to follow from an
implementation of the documented recognitions and guarantees found, for example, in articles 2
("[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms"), 6 ("right to recognition everywhere as a person"), 7
("[a~ll are equal before the law and are entitled . . .to equal protection of the law"), and 8 ("right to an
effective remedy") of the Universal Declaration. Interrelated, of course, are articles 18 (right to freedom of
thought, including the right "alone or in community with others" to "manifest" a "belief in teaching,
practice . . . and observance"), and 26 (the right to education, including an "education" directed toward
"the strengthening of respect for human rights"). Professor Cassese recognizes that the newer Helsinki
language is related to rights to "enjoy" human rights and to have "effective domestic remedies" which also
relate to corresponding duties of states. See Cassese, supra note 3, at 286. On the right to an effective
1, 3.
remedy, see also 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 2,
9. As explained more fully below, this recognition is relevant to the fact that deprivations of fundamental human rights have become matters of international concern and thus are not matters essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a violator state within the meaning of article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
See zfta text accompanying notes 103-04.
10. See Final Act, supra note 1, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields § 1 [hereinafter cited as
Basket III].
11. See id §2.
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efforts to assure a more effective enjoyment by all persons of a transnational
freedom of speech. Such doubts are founded on the widespread recognition that
the Helsinki conferees did not actually intend to create a legal instrument and,
furthermore, that they had expressly declared in principle X of the Final Act that
12
the Declaration on Principles "[did] not affect their rights and obligations."'
Yet, a document not initially intended to be legally binding can subsequently
take on a legal import or even become part of customary international law.13 Has
the Helsinki Final Act acquired any such status in the last six years? What is the
legal nature of the Final Act? Has it produced any legal effects? What is its
present utility? What future potential lies within its words or, more realistically
and importantly, within the actual patterns of human subjectivity and practice
that condition the legal nature and meaning of any document? These and related
questions are explored below.
II
LEGAL NATURE OF THE FINAL ACT

In terms of traditional approaches to the concept of law and a legally binding
international instrument, the point has been made several times that the Helsinki
Final Act is not a "legal" instrument and is not technically "binding" as such.
This view is generally shared by textwriters 14 and government experts 15 from the
12.

See generally inra notes 14-19. With regard to the import of principle X, see Bastid, The Speciazl

Sigiicanceofthe HelsinkiFinalAct, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD

13 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Frowein, The Interrelationshib Between the Helsinki Final Act, the International
Covenants on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 81 n.4 CF. Buergenthal ed. 1977); see also Jonathan & Jacqu6, Obligations
Assumed by the HelsitkiSignatories, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD

51 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Kiss & Dominick, The InternationalLegal Sgnicance ofthe Human Rights Provisions ofthe Helsinki Final Act, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 297 (1980).
13. See, e.g., Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclusions, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 6-7 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977) (setting

forth the conclusions of a private conference of U.S. and West European lawyers held in June 1977);
Frowein, supra note 12, at 72; Jonathan & Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 53; Schachter, The Twilight Exstence of
Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 300-01, 304 (1977); see also Kiss & Dominick,

supra note 12, at 315.
14. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6; Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jursdlition,'" in
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 25 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Kiss &
Dominick, supra note 12, at 296-300, 303, 306, 315; Leary, The Implementation ofthe Human Rights Provisions of
the Helsinki Fal Act, A Prehminagy Assessment. /975-1977, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE HELSINKI ACCORD 111 (1. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Schachter, supra note 13, at 296. Cf L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMITT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (1980); Bishop, Introduction, Symposium:
Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord-A Five- Year Road to Madrid, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249, 250
(1980); Coughlin, Monitoring of the Helsinki Accords. Belgrade 1977, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 511, 512-13,
515 (1978); Fryer, Soviet Human Rights: Law and folitics in Perspective, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 296, 296
n.4 (1970); Goldberg, Human Rights and the Belgrade Meeting, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 249 (1978); Kiss &
Dominick, supra note 12, at 307-08, 313, 315; Nafziger, supra note 3, at 561, 568; Turack, Freedom of TransnationalMovement." The Helsuiki Accordand Beyond, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 586 (1978); Comment, The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Implicationsfor Soviet-American Detente, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 122, 138, 142-44 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Russell, The Helsinki Declaraton. Brobdingnag or Liliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 246-48
(1976); Russell, Follow-up at Madrid Another Chancefor the UnitedStates, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 361
(1980); Scholleart, 71 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 241, 242 (1977); Vest, Remarks by the Assistant Secretary
of State, 1978 ABA Law Professor Workshop, reprinted in ABA, CONFRONTATION IN THE AMERICANSOVIET RELATIONSHIP:

CAN IT BE MANAGED? 33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Workshop]; Nimetz,

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 45: No. I

7
United States, Western Europe, 16 and Eastern Europe.'
The following statement of European scholars made in a committee report on
the Helsinki Final Act for the International Law Association (I.L.A.) is representative: "The Helsinki Final Act, in its dispositions on human rights, does not intend
to create new legal obligations. Mutual agreement existed during the whole negotiations that the result of the Conference should. . . be a common declaration but
not a legal instrument."' 18 The I.L.A. committee also recognized that two reports
presented at an international symposium in 1976 "[could] be cited in support of
this interpretation. Professor Skubiszewski from Poland underlined that the
guiding principles of the Act of 1975 were not legally binding rules, but rather a
program for future cooperation. . . . Professor Delbruck from the Federal
Republic of Germany agreed that no legal obligations were intended."' 19
Nevertheless, the committee warned, "[t]he participating states, by adhering to
these principles, lay down a guide for their future conduct and enter into a moral
obligation to conform to these principles." '2 0 Others have also stressed the view
that important moral obligations are inherent in the Helsinki Final Act. 2 1 At least
one American writer has insightfully added the related point:

Remarks, ABA Workshop at 36, 95; Nimetz, Conference on Securziy and Cooperation in Europe: Retrospect and
Prospect, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 325 (1980); Oliver, Remarks, ABA Workshop at 35. For similar
documented views of the U.S. Government, see Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 296 n.8, 299, 306 n.61.
16. See, e.g., Bastid, supra note 12, at 13; Frowein, supra note 12, at 72; Higgins, Appendxr to REPORT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM HELSINKI REVIEW GROUP, FROM HELSINKI TO BELGRADE 1 (1977) (Lord Thomson, chairman); Jonathan & Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 52; Robertson, The Helsinki Agreement and Human
Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 34, 34-35 (1977); Scheuner, Driessen, Lester, Meessen, Menendez, &
Schweissfurth, in REPORT OF THE FIrTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE, MANILA, 1978 130-31 (I.L.A. 1980)
(authors are members of a committee of the International Law Association which issued the First Preliminary Report of the Sub-committee on the Helsinki Declaration and the Equal Application of Human
Rights) [hereinafter cited as ILA REPORT); Remarks of Delbuck, ILA REPORT, at 130-31 (citing I
DRITITES DEUTSCHPOLNISCHES JURISTEN-KOLLOQUIM: KSZE-SCHLUSSAKTE 13, 31 (R. Bernhardt, von
Munch & W. Rudolf eds. 1977)); Uibopuu, The InternationalLegal Status of Soviet Minorities Today, 2 REx'.
SOCIALIST L. 217, 218-19 (Leiden 1976); see also Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determinatiln, in
HUMAN

RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 107 (T.

Buergenthal ed.

1977);

Schweissfurth, Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur, Verbindhchkeit und volkerrechlichen Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte, 36
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 681 passim (1976), ctedin
Frowein, supra note 12, at 81 n.5 for a similar proposition. For similar documented views of the French
government, see Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 296 n.8, 297 n.16, 306 n.61. Kiss and Dominick also
cite the French author Prevost for a similar proposition. See id.at 296 n.8 (citing Prevost, Observationssurla
naturejuridiquede l'Actefmal de la Conjerencesur la Sicurilt ella Coop4 ralton en Europe, ANNUAIRE FRAN9AIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 130, 141 (1977)).
17. See, e.g., Dimitrijevi6, supra note 3, at 272; Chalidze, The Humanitanan Provisions of the Helsiki

Accord A Critique of Their Stgniftance, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 434-35 (1980); Pechota, East European Perceptionsof the Helsinki FinalActand the Role of Citizen Initiatives, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 467, 473.
Cf id at 493; Sherer, Remarks by the Ambassador, 1978 ABA Law Professor Workshop, reprintedin ABA
Workshop, supra note 15, at 66; Remarks by Skubiszewski, cited i ILA REPORT, sapra note 16, at 130, 131
n.21; Milojevic, in ILA REPORT, supra note 16, at 130-31, 134 (author is member of ILA Committee).
18.

ILA REPORT, supra note 16, at 130.

19. Id.at 130-31.
20. Id at 130; see also id at 131 ("Itlhe Final Act imposes upon them a moral obligation").
21. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6 (setting forth a relevant conclusion of a private conference); Cassese, supra note 16, at 107; Dimitrijevik, supra note 3, at 272; Fascell, The CSCE Follow-up Mechanism From Belgrade to Madrid, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 336 (1980); Jonathan & Jacqu6, supra note
12, at 52-53; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 300; Nafziger, supra note 3, at 561; Robertson, supra note
16, at 35; Russell, The Helsinki Declaration, supra note 15, at 248 ("deemed to be a moral commitment");
Schachter, supra note 13, at 304; Turack, supra note 14, at 586; Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State
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As long as they do last, even nonbinding agreements can be authoritative and controlling
for the parties. There is no a priori reason to assume that the undertakings are illusory
It would seem wiser to recognize that nonbinding agreebecause they are not legal. . .
seek to reinforce their moral
ments may be attainable when binding treaties are not and 2to
2
and political commitments when they serve ends we value.

Professor Vojin Dimitrijevi6 from Yugoslavia might add:
It is to be expected that the signatory States would not risk political and moral responsibility (which for states as well as individuals can sometimes be more painful than legal
sanctions) by not complying with the agreed obligations. This. . . is not only experienced
in the form of criticism. . . . Constant reminders by the public abroad and at home
threaten a nation's
prestige, which is in itself an element of power to be neglected only at
23
one's own peril.

The main point, which is shared by the last two writers, is profound. It not only
raises questions concerning a functional difference between legal obligations and
moral-political obligations, but also points toward the kind of inquiry one might
make in order to address more realistically the problems and potential approaches
to solution involved in any effort to implement an international agreement.
Other views have been expressed; some even suggest that the act represents
actual legal obligations. For example, a Czechoslovak writer has stated that the
Final Act, like the 1966 Covenants, sets forth "binding standards that ought to be
followed, ' 24 even though "[t]he official position of most East European countries is
that the Helsinki Accord confers no rights directly on the individual." 2 5 He gives
much of his argument away, however, when he asks: "Why not . . . take a bolder

step by giving the Final Act tacit or implicit recognition as a legally binding obligation?" 2 6 Implicitly, the writer acknowledges that such a recognition does not
now generally exist.
Professor Christopher Osakwe points out that certain Soviet authors "contend,
most unequivocally, that the Helsinki Accord is a binding document" and a
"source of international law."'2 7 Some even declared that the Final Act "has a
special political and legal significance, . . . contains independent normative rules
Vest, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 33; see also Nimetz, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 96 ("reflects
basic Western values . . . our own values").
22. Schachter, supra note 13, at 304. For a related view that "moral and political obligations are not
necessarily illusory," see Jonathan & Jacqu&, supra note 12, at 53 (citing Virally, La .Dicenniepour le dkveloppe-

ment,

ANNUAIRE FRAN4.AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,

at 29 (1970)); Schreuer, Recommendations and the

Traditional Sources ofinternational Law, 20 GERMAN YRBK. INT'L L. 103, 104-05, 112-18 (1977).
23. Dimitrijevik,supra note 3, at 272-73. On this point, see also Jonathan &Jacqu6, supra note 12, at
53, adding: "For the defaulting state, the failure to fulfill moral and political obligations would entail a
loss of prestige and credibility . . . "; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 300 (costs and benefits). The Staff
Director and General Counsel to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has also
stated: "Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership have attached their own personal political prestige to the
Final Act. It is very difficult for the Soviets to renounce the Helsinki Final Act or to ignore it." Oliver,
supra note 15, at 35. On Brezhnev's personal stake, see also Russell, The Helsinki Declaration, supra note 15,
at 246.
24. Pechota, supra note 17, at 468. Pechota equates the Final Act with the 1966 Covenants and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
25. Id at 473; see also id at 480 (official hostility), 482 passtim.
26. Id at 494.
27. Osakwe, Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on the Sources of General International Law, 73 PRoc. AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 310, 322 (1979). For further evidence of a Soviet view that international practice shows that states
are bound by the Helsinki Final Act, see Uibopuu, supra note 16, at 229 n. 14 (citing the Soviet author S.
Malinin, Soeshchanie v. Helsinki (1975 g.) i mezhdunarodnoe pravo, Pravovedenie 1976, No. 2, 22).
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. . . [and was] officially recognized by all participating states as constituting a
component part of the international law in force."' 28 Nevertheless, others suggest
that the Soviets generally were not interested in recognizing new human rights
obligations and that any Soviet reference to binding obligations is best related to
29
the Helsinki provisions on the use of force and impermissible intervention.
The Soviet authors quoted above were referring to the legal nature of the Final
Act in its totality. 30 They were necessarily, therefore, referring to the human rights
provisions of the act as well. Moreover, the acknowledged Soviet tendency "to
distinguish between the legally binding nature of the Declaration of Principles and
the recommendatory or programmatic character of other provisions," such as the
Basket III provisions, 3' does not preclude the inference that the Soviets recognize
that the Helsinki Act contains legal obligations pertaining to human rights. This
is especially true because principle VII of the Declaration on Principles is expressly
directed toward recognition and implementation of the human rights of all persons. 32 Nevertheless, it would seem partly unrealistic to assume that such a recognition, even if widely shared among Soviet elites, would allow one comfortably to
conclude that the Soviets feel legally bound to implement the normative phrasescontained in principle VII. Not only is the Soviet view regarding implementation
of human rights quite different, at least overtly, from that of much of the international community, 33 but there is also little evidence to suggest that the existing
official governmental view is different from actual Soviet practice either prior or
subsequent to the formal signing of a document at Helsinki. That practice, in fact,
34
has been thwarting of the human rights mentioned in the Final Act.
28. Osakwe, supra note 27, at 322 (quoting G. IGNATENKO & D. OSTAPENKO, INTERNATIONAL LAW
71-72 (1978)).
29. See, e.g., Jonathan & Jacqu&, supra note 12, at 43; Russell, The Helsinki Declaration,supra note 15, at
244-46; Comment, supra note 14, at 125, 135-36, 143; see also Dean, Beyond He/sinkt: The Sovet View of Human
Rights b? International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 84-85 (1980); Robertson, supra note 16, at 38; in/ a text
accompanying note 31.
30. See G. IGNATENKO & D. OSTAPENKO, supra note 28; cf. tnra text accompanying note 31.
31. Pechota, supra note 17, at 493.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9. At least one U.S. official has written that the human rights
provisions in the Declaration on Principles are more important than those contained in "the well-publicized Basket III" portions of the Final Act. NAmetz, supra note 15, at 325. A European writer agrees. See
Robertson, supra note 16, at 36.
33. See, e.g., Uibopuu, The Human Rights Covenants of the United Nations and the Constitutional Law of the
USSR, in PAPERS ON SOVIET LAw 14 (1977); Uibopuu, The InternationalLegal Obligationsof the USSR/or the
Protection of Individuals, 14 CO-EXISTENCE 266 (1977); Dean, supra note 29, and authorities cited therein;
Feldbrugge, The Soviet Human Rights Doctrine in the Crossfire Between Dissidents at Home and Critics Abroad, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1980); Paust, supra note 2, at 646-50, and authorities cited therein; see also
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 76-79; Funk, Lessons ofSoviet jurprudence: Law
for Social Change Versus Individual Rights, 7 IND. L. REV. 449 (1974). On Soviet violations of human rights
law, see Chalidze, supra note 17, at 431-34, 447-48; Fryer, supra note 14; Goldberg, Human Rights and the
Belgrade Meeting, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319-20 (1980); Goldberg, supra note 14, at 251-52;
Grzybowski, PenalRegimes and Dissenters i'n
the Soviet Orbit, 43 LAwNx
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (1979); Human
Rights Comm'n, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, THE PERSECUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN HEI.SINKI

GROUP (Canada 1980); Leary, supra note 14, at 122-26passim; Leary, The Right of the lndividual to Know and
Act Upon His Rights and Duties: Monitoring Groups and the Helsinki FinalAct, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375
(1980); Nafziger, supra note 3, at 565-56; Turack, supra note 2, at 112-13; Turack, supra note 14, at 591,60607.
34. See, e.g. , supra note 33. For more recent evidence, see also Killing the Spirit of Helsinki' A tough new
crackdown on dirsidents, TIME, Dec. 1, 1980, at 45; Marchenko, a Dissident, Goes on Trialin Soviet, N.Y. Times,
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This realization might be painful for those keenly interested in alleviating the
human suffering and injustice that is necessarily involved in the deprivation of
fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, not every conference document that
mentions human rights is actually authoritative in the community. Nor is every
such document reflective of general patterns of legal expectation and behavior or
of ongoing social patterns that form the basis of law in any particular or more
general social process.35 Certainly a "nonbinding" document may reflect one or
more legal norms that are recognized in customary law, some authoritative legal
instrument, or both. 36 The Final Act contains at least some presently recognized
legal norms. Moreover, a "nonbinding" document can contribute through time to
the shaping of attitudes and behavior to such an extent that it becomes accepted
either as a legally relevant aid for the interpretation of other international3 7 and
39
domestic381 legal instruments, or as evidence of customary international law.
Sept. 3, 1981, at 5, cot. 4;AMusical Freedom and Why DictatorsFear It, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1981, § 2, at 1, cot.
5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at 4, cot. 6 (five-year term of internment for defaming the state in an underground journal); Demonstration Seeks to Aid Dissident, Hous. Chronicle, Aug. 6, 1981, at 17, cot. I (U.S.-born
Lithuanian serving a seven and one half year sentence for writing anti-Soviet article); N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
1981, at 14, cot. 6 (letter to the editor); Moscow Silencing Pychiatg Criti's, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1981, at 3,
cot. 1; Soviet Lifts Cittzenship ofa Satirical Writer, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1981, at 5, cot. 6; Soviet PychiatrittHeld,
Hous. Chronicle, Feb. 19, 1981, at 8, cot. 6 (psychiatrist and engineer); US Report Says Status of Rights
Improved During '80, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1981, at 10, cot. 1; Soviet Is Said to Give Jai Terms to 2 Dissidents
From Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1980, at 15, cot. 5; Dissident Russian PriestIs Given 5- Year Sentence, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 29. 1980, at 9, col. 3; CarterAssails Soviets on Rights, L.A. Times, July 30, 1980, at 5, col. 3; Soviet
Polce Said oAccuse Actiit of an Olympics Plot, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1980, at 7, col. 1; Rights Group Says Soviet
Has Detained 400 Dissidents, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1980, at 6, cot. 2.
35. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 273; see also Schreuer, supra
note 22. On the more general jurisprudential point, see, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN,
supra note 3; Paust, The Concept of Aorm: Toward a Better Understandingof Content, Authority; and Choice, 53
TuMP. L.Q. 226 (1980). As Professor Michael Reisman has recently remarked, conference documents that
are not expected to reflect law, although they contain certain terms that read like legal terms, are not law.
He also stressed the difference between what he termed lex simulata or "pretend law" and law actually
extant in the social process. See Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PROC. AM.
SOC. INT'L L. (1981) (in press).
36. See, e.g., M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CI-IEN, supra note 3, at 274; Buergenthal, supra note
13, at 6, 8; Jonathan &Jacqu,supra note 12, at 45-46, 52;see also Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 315;
Schreuer, supra note 22, at 106-10. It is perhaps for this reason that Rosalyn Higgins has suggested that a
great part of the Final Act is binding. See Higgins, supra note 16, at 1 ("not . . . without legal significance"
and confirms "already binding" human rights law), 4, 7-11.
37.

See, e.g.,

M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 274, 302, 325-26, 330;

Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6-7; Frowein, supra note 12, at 72; Schwelb, The Influence of the Unversal
Declaration ofHuman Rights on Internationaland NationalLaw, 53 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 217, 219-22 (1959).
For a recent U.S. case utilizing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in this and similar ways, see
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
38.

See, e.g., M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 330; Schreuer, supra note 22,

at 104; Schwelb, supra note 37, at 222-27; United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, ST/HR/2,
at 17-18, U.N. Sales No. E.74.XIV.2 (1974). For a recent U.S. case, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting a U.S. statute). On this general point, see also Paust, supra note 2, at 66669; Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 230-31, 233 n.26, 235-37, 240-42, 244, and cases cited therein.
39. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 274, 325-26; Buergenthal,
supra note 13, at 6; see also Cassese, supra note 16, at 107; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 315: Russell,
The Helsinki Declaration,supra note 15, at 248 (many think the Helsinki Final Act may become a source of
customary law); Schachter, supra note 13, at 300. For recent U.S. cases using the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as evidence of customary law, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980);
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980), afrdon othergrounds, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388
(10th Cir. 1981) (still using the Universal Declaration as an interpretive aid); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn. 1980). These are reviewed in Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 230-37,
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Unfortunately, the Helsinki Final Act has not yet achieved such an acceptance,
even though it has already produced domestic legal effects.
In view of the above, one can sympathize with a recent effort by Professor
Alexandre Kiss and Mary Dominick to reconstitute the Final Act as "one of the
new forms of international legal instruments, ' 40 "a special category of international legal instruments. . . [:] non-binding, but directive texts which produce limited legal effects" 4 1 and which have "a specific legal nature as an internationally
agreed upon program. '42 But law and legal natures cannot simply be wished into
existence when the relevant social community does not consider such a document a
legal one or, more importantly, when it is not the case that each of its provisions
reflects patterns of generally shared legal expectation. Kiss and Dominick admit
that "the general consensus [during formation] was to deny binding character to
its provisions, '4 3 and that subsequent practice of the participating states has "constantly stressed the non-binding character of the Final Act."' 44 Further, most
writers agree that the act "creates mainly moral and political obligations, '4 5 that it
presently has "no binding [legal] character, '46 and that whether or not it "will
lead to the creation of customary international law is an open question. '47 Thus,
the needed base of generally shared legal expectation concerning the act as such is
presently lacking.
What Kiss and Dominick seem to substitute for the missing patterns of expectation, or opiniojuris, is the admitted fact that the Final Act has produced "legal
effects." '48 They argue that these effects "place it within the scope of international
law." 49 The circle of reasoning does not close, however. It simply does not follow
that because a document produces "legal effects" (for example, a change in a
domestic statute), it is itself a legal document, a legally binding document, "a special category of international legal instruments," 50 or even a document that has "a
specific legal nature." 51 Such a status is for the future.
Similarly, Professor William Bishop has recognized that the Final Act "is not
legally binding," and adds, "[n]onetheless, in some respects it has been talked
about and treated almost as if it were a legal commitment by the states which are
parties. '5 2 If such talk and treatment continue, and someday help to shape pat240-44. This general method of normative development has long been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700passbn (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d at 880-84; Paust, Comment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 601 (1978); Paust, supra note 2, at 666-70, and cases
cited therein.
40. Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 308.
41. Id at 314-15.
42. Id at 313.
43. Id at. 296.
44. Id at 296 n.8.
45. Id at 300.
46. Id at 303, 307; see also id at 296-300, 312-13, 315.
47. Id at 315.
48. See id at 300, 303, 312, 315.
49. Id at 307; see also id at 314-15.
50. See supra note 41.
51. See supra note 42.
52. Bishop, supra note 14, at 250.
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terns of more widespread and intensely held legal expectation, a document not
now legally binding as such may become a "legal instrument. '' 5 3 Knowing this,
' 54
some writers may even have intentionally utilized words such as "duty,
"rules, ' 5 5 or "violations" 56 (without the qualifiers "moral" or "political") in an
attempt to further such an outcome.
It is also noteworthy that some private Helsinki monitoring groups may actually believe that the Final Act is a legal instrument and may be seeking to promote
such an expectation. On the other hand, they may simply share the more common
opinion that the Final Act is an important political document that recognizes, in
significant ways, that a human rights law exists and must be effectively guaranteed
and implemented according to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 57 In any event, the private monitoring groups themselves are an
important outcome and part of the ongoing Helsinki process. As explained below,
they also contribute significantly to the many legal effects which flow from such a
process.
III
LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS

A.

Private Monitoring Groups

Several writers have commented on the fact that the Helsinki Final Act was
one of the main catalysts for the creation of private human rights monitoring
groups. 58 The creation of these private groups and their role as defenders of
human rights has been termed "a development which few at Helsinki in 1975
could have predicted. '59 Yet it is this development which may well have placed
the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in recorded history. For
example, Valery Chalidze states that such a historic place has been reserved for
these provisions "by virtue of not so much their content as the strong public
response they have elicited." 6
53. See, e.g., supra notes 37, 39.
54. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 2, at 286; see also Goldberg, supra note 33, at 320 ("obligations").
55. See, e.g.. Pechota, supra note 17, at 492; see also id. at 468 ("binding standards").
56. See, e.g. , Goldberg, supra note 33, at 320; see also Pechota, supra note 17, at 472 ("infringements of
the obligations assumed").
57. On the more recently accepted nature of human rights law, nation-state obligations, and individual rights (including the right to an effective remedy identifiable in article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as supplemented by articles 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Declaration), see generally supra
notes 2-8 and the symposium on litigating human rights, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Cabranes, Reftecttons on the Belgrade Meeting (/977-78) of the Conference on Securi'y and Cooperation in Europe, 4 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 274, 277, 279 (1978); Chalidze, supra note 17, at 430-31;
Errera, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the InternationalProtectionof Human Rights, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
409-10 (1980); Leary, supra note 33, at 375-76; Leary, supra note 14, at 121-25; Pechota, supra note 17, at
479; Robertson, supra note 16, at 38-40; Oliver, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 36-38; Human Rights
Comm'n, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, supra note 33, at 5. The other main catalyst was the ratification by many states of the UN Covenants. See, e.g., Errera, supra at 409-10, 412, 425-26, 428; Robertson,
supra note 16, at 38.
59. Errera, supra note 58, at 428; see also Leary, supra note 33, at 375; Robertson, supra note 16, at 40;
Oliver, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 36-37.
60. Chalidze, supra note 17, at 429, adding: "The Helsinki Accord created more world public interest
than much more complete documents of international law guaranteeing human rights." Id. at 429-30 n. 1.
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Although many of the East European members of such groups have suffered
greatly as a result of governmental crackdowns, 6 t their suffering has attracted
greater attention to human rights law and to the need for more adequate implementation of the human rights of all persons. The efforts of such groups have
62
increased the general awareness of governmental violations of human rights.
They have also contributed to several "linkages" between and among individuals
and groups 63 which are likely to add an important dimension to ongoing efforts at
private implementation and sanctioning of international law. 64 In this sense, these
groups are on the "front line" of such an effort, stimulated in part by the Helsinki
process.
There are, of course, many Helsinki monitoring groups in the West whose
activities also contribute to the "legal effects" of the Final Act. 65 There are even
groups monitoring the performance of the U.S. Government. 6 6 As suggested by
Professor Virginia Leary, these private implementary groups are not only the
product of the Helsinki Final Act, but also are legitimized by the portion of principle VII of the act wherein the participating states "confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties."' 67 Nevertheless, such a right
arguably had already existed in more authoritative human rights instruments 68
and was merely supplemented in an important way or "confirmed" by the Helsinki Final Act. In any event, the Helsinki process has certainly furthered transnational efforts to make each human being's right "to seek, receive and impart
69
information and ideas . . . regardless of frontiers" more meaningful.

See also Leary, supra note 33, at 394 ("one of the most important contributions" of the Final Act has been
the spawning of private monitoring groups).

61. See, e.g, supra notes 33-34; Chalidze, supra note 17, at 431, 434; Coughlin, supra note 14, at 517;
Errera, supra note 58, at 410-11, 421-25; Leary, supra note 14, at 122-25; Leary, supra note 33, at 377-83,
387; Paust, supra note 2, at 646-52; Pechota, supra note 17, at 480-84, 486, 488-89; Turner, The Artist inthe
Amphitheatre, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 308, 308-10, 312, 318 (1979); Turack, supra note 2, at 112-13;
Turack, supra note 14, at 591-92, 597-98, 606-07; 15 Czechoslovak Dissidents Reported Seized in Prague, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1980, at 5,col. 2; Vsiting Brtish Educator Expelled by Czechoslovaks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980,
at 5, col. 2; Czechs Said toRelease DissidentJaled 3 Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1980, at 7, col. 6.

62. See, e.g.
,supra note 61; Statement of President Carterquoledin ABA Workshop,supra note 15, at 35
n.23, 114; Oliver, supra note 15, at 37-38, 78, 119.
63. See Oliver, supra note 15, at 38; see also Errera, supra note 58, at 411; Leary,supra note 33, at 387;
Pechota, supra note 17, at 487-88.
64. With regard to private sanction processes, see, e.g., Paust, Response toTerronsm: A Prologue toDecisian Concerning Private Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 79 (1977), and materials cited therein.
65. See, e.g., Leary, supra note 14, at 121; Leary, supra note 33, at 383-90, 394; Oliver,supra note 15, at
119.
66. See, e.g., R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS-PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 871 (1979); Fascell, supra note 21, at 354; Leary, supra note 33, at 384-86, 388-90, 393-95. On the
monitoring of the United States, see also Leary, supra note 14, at 125-29; and Carliner, United States Compiance with the Helsinki Final Act: The Treatment of Ahens, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397 (1980).
67. Leary, supra note 33, at 375, 377. She attributes credit "for seizing upon" this provision to the
groups in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Id at 394. For a similar viewpoint, see Errera, supra note 58, at
427; Pechota, supra note 17, at 478-79, 484. Pechota adds that international support for such groups is "not
only appropriate as an expression of human solidarity but also fully justified, both morally and juridically." See also supra text accompanying note 3; Fox, Remarks, 75 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. (1981) (in press).
68.

See, e.g., supra note 8.

69.

Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 19.
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Changes in Law

Another effect of the Helsinki process has been to precipitate change in
domestic laws and regulations of participating states. For example, in the United
States a joint congressional-executive agency, the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, was established to provide governmentally based monitoring of compliance with the Final Act. 70 The President submits semiannual
reports to the Commission 7' which uses the reports as well as materials prepared
by many private groups 72 to issue its own publications and reports on the implementation of human rights. 73 In the words of Professor Leary, "The Commission
has served as a focal point for individuals and organizations . . .[and its] reports
as well as its public hearings have been an indispensable source of useful informa74
tion on implementation of the Accord."
Certain changes in U.S. visa and immigration laws and regulations are a direct
result of efforts to comply with the Helsinki Final Act. 75 U.S. practice in that
regard, however, has been severely criticized.7 6 A further example of U.S. developments is the Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, which
was established by President Carter to improve the "rather sad state" of foreign
language instruction in this country in order to increase cultural understanding in
accordance with the Final Act. 7 7 Such an effort must logically contribute to the
development of transnational human contacts and freedom of speech.
Other changes in law include incorporation of all ten principles of the Final
Act's Declaration on Principles into article 29 of the 1976 Soviet Constitution. 78
Human rights do not fare well, however, under other provisions of the Soviet Constitution as interpreted in practice by Soviet elites. 79 Perhaps the new Treaty on
Transboundary Air Pollution that arose out of the Helsinki experience will be
more meaningful. 80
70. 22 U.S.C. § 3001 (1976). For background information on the creation of the Commission, see
Leary, supra note 14, at 117-19.
71. See, e.g., Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 301.
72. See, e.g. , Oliver, supra note 15, at 118-19; Leary, supra note 33, at 386 (testimony before the Commission), 388-89, 391-93 (numerous contacts and public hearings).
73. See, e.g., Fascell, supra note 21, at 354 (first self-monitoring survey report); Leary, supra note 33, at
378, 390-92; Oliver, supra note 15, at 119-20.
74. Leary, supra note 33, at 392.
75. See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 58, at 287; Carliner, supra note 66, at 400, 402 n.25; Leary, supra note
14, at 128; Oliver, supra note 15, at 120.
76. See, e.g., Carliner, supra note 66; Leary, supra note 14, at 128. Carliner mentions the failure of the
United States to eliminate barriers to travel and to promote family reunification. See Carliner, supra note
66, at 399. He mentions especially passport and visa restrictions for short-term visitors to the United States
and those seeking to emigrate, id at 400, and the selective exclusion of aliens from the United States by the
executive branch, usually on "political grounds" or because of political beliefs of the applicant and/or
membership in certain organizations. See id at 407-08. Leary also mentions criticism of U.S. restrictions
concerning short term entry visitors of a "suspect" ideological persuasion or membership. See Leary, supra
note 14, at 128.
77. Oliver, supra note 15, at 120; see also Cabranes, supra note 58, at 287 (citing Exec. Order No.
12,054, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,457 (1978)).
78. See, e.g., Fascell, supra note 21, at 346.
79. See, e.g., Uibopuu, The Human Rights Covenants, supra note 33; Dean, supra note 29; Feldbrugge,
supra note 33, at 462 (arts. 39, 50-51, 62) passim; Paust, supra note 1,at 646-50.
80. See, e.g., Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 313; Fascell, supra note 21, at 352.
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C.

Domestic Cases

Within the last six years, there has been little judicial use of the Helsinki Final
Act. No known Eastern European cases use the Final Act, perhaps due to the fact
that even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not been publicized and
attempts to use it or any other human rights legal instruments in court proceedings
have been repressed. 8 ' In contrast, a judicial opinion in Turkey cited the Helsinki
8 2
Final Act in striking down a law adversely affecting foreign journalists.
In the United States, although only two federal courts have cited the Final Act
in their opinions, the act has been cited by litigants and by the U.S. Government
in an amicus brief during judicial proceedings. 8 3 In a New York case addressing
prison conditions, a petitioner argued that in the Final Act, as well as in other
instruments, the United States had committed itself to fulfill its human rights obligations. 84 The matter was finally settled by the state attorney general, "apparently because prison officials had violated prison rules." 85 A more important
development involved the U.S. Government's amicus brief before the Second Circuit in Filar/igav. Pena-Irala.86 There, the Government recognized that customary
international law includes the obligation of nation-states "to observe fundamental
human rights."'8 7 The Government's brief also recognized that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "goes beyond the UN Charter in specifying and
defining the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled," adding:
"The Universal Declaration has been followed by a growing number of UN resolutions clarifying and elaborating on these rights or invoking them in specific
cases. "

88

The Government then took this position on the legal nature and effect of the
Helsinki Final Act: "In a parallel development, the International Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe . . . adopted a Final Act . .

.

. The Final

Act, like the UN resolutions, does not have the legal effect of a treaty but provides
evidence of customary international law."8' 9 The Court in F/ariga utilized the
Universal Declaration to identify the content of Charter obligations and cus81. See generally Pechota, supra note 17, at 482-83, 494.
82. See Aybay, The InternationalHuman Rights Instruments and the Turkish Law, TURKISH YRBK. OF H.R.
17, 23-25 (1979); Nimetz, supra note 15, at 36.
83. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300 n.48 (1981) (purpose of amendment of the Passport Act was to
achieve greater compliance with the Helsinki Final Act); Jones v. Unknown Agents of Fed. Elec. Comm'n,
613 F.2d 864, 869 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
84. See Turner v. Ward, Superior Court (1977), reprintedin R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 66,
at 120-21.
85. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 66, at 121.
86. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Fidartiga involved a private cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1976) (the Alien Tort Statute) for torture and wrongful death of a Paraguayan youth by a Paraguayan
Inspector General of Police. Human rights and other norms of international law were relevant with regard
to questions concerning both federal court jurisdiction and the substantive law upon which a cause of
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 rests. For further exposition, see, e.g., Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at
230732, 234-37, 240-44, and Symposium, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).
87. Amicus Brief for the United States at 9, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief]. The Amicus Brief has been reprinted at 19 INT'L L. MATERIALS 585
(1980). See also Amicus Brief supra at 5, 8, 10-11.
88. Amicus Brief, supra note 87, at 9.
89. Id at 9-10.
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tomary international law. 90 Unfortunately, the court made no mention of the Helsinki Final Act. In any event, the recent Fiarltgaand Fernandez v. W'lkinson 9 1 cases
should prove to be of significance during efforts to provide greater judicial recogni92
tion and implementation of fundamental human rights.
D.

Other Practices

One of the most noted effects of the Helsinki process has been the increased
freedom of movement across state boundaries for individuals and the interrelated
impact of this freedom upon family reunification. 93 Although free emigration has
been spotty and relatively rare, 94 the Helsinki process has contributed to the
greater enjoyment of such a human right, particularly in light of historic conditions. 95 As several have commented, the Helsinki process has allowed the United
States more direct bilateral contact with Eastern European governments, 96 which
has resulted in freer emigration, more family reunification, and, within certain
97
countries, a greater freedom in the exercise of religion.
These practices have contributed somewhat to a freer flow of ideas, but most
agree that the records of Soviet and other Eastern European countries on transnational freedom of speech continue to be very poor, 98 with the possible exception of
Yugoslavia. 99 As Ambassador Goldberg has written of the Belgrade follow-up
meeting in 1977-78, "We expressed our deep concern about repression. . . , about
the jamming of radio broadcasts, [and] about the failure to permit adequate dis90. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 879; Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 230, 234-36, 240,
244.
91. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980). Fernandez involved habeas corpus challenges to the detention by
the United States of several hundred Cuban refugees in a maximum security prison for more than six
months without charges. Human rights and other norms of international law were used by the district
court as a basis for its conclusion that federal detention was unconstitutional, and by the circuit court as
aids for the interpretation of relevant statutory and constitutional norms. For further exposition, see, e.g.,
Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 232-36, 242, 244, and Symposium, 4 Hous. J. INr'L L. 1 (1981).
92. See Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 229, 244 passim.
93. See, e.g., Leary, supra note 14, at 132-33; Dean, supra note 29, at 86; Thomas, 73 PRoc. AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 136 (1979); Thomas, 70 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1976); Turack, supra note 3, at 109
passim; Turack, supra note 14, at 590passim; Assistant Secretary of State Vest, supra note 15, at 53; Nimetz,
id at 92, 95.
94. See Nimetz, supra note 15, at 92.
95. For more detailed consideration of this human right, see, e.g., M. McDoUcAL, H. LASSWELL & L.
CHEN, supra note 3, at 895 passim; Universal Declaration, supra note 3, arts. 3, 4, 9, 13(2), 15(2); Uibopuu,
The Human Rights Covenants, supra note 33, at 45-49; Uibopuu, In Search of a Most FavorableStatus/orRefugees..4 Comparisonof InternationalLegal Instruments Deahng with Human Rights, 14(23) A. WORLD REFUGEES BULL.
149, 154-57 (1976).
96. See, e.g., Vest, supra note 15, at 53; Nimetz, supra note 15, at 94-95; Fascell, supra note 21, at 353
(also mentioning an extensive human rights meeting between the United States and Romania in 1980).
On the utility of the Helsinki process for human rights "discussion and persuasion," see Hansell, 71 PROc.
AM. Soc. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1977); see also Friendly, 73 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 195 (1979); Comment,
supra note 14, at 138.
97. Countries mentioned were: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (which is one
of the most open and is labeled as nonaligned).
98. See, e.g., Feldbrugge, supra note 33, at 456, 462, 464; Leary, supra note 14, at 140-48; Nimetz, supra
note 15, at 92-93; Paust, supra note 2, at 646-52; supra notes 33, 34, 61.
99. Compare Dimitrijevi6, supra note 2, at 263 with Paust, supra note 2, at 651, and materials cited
therein and Turner, supra note 61, at 318.
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,1o
".. Such
semination of Western newspapers, books, and religious materials .
practices continue even though the United States and the Soviets spend billions
annually on radio and other media for global propaganda efforts. 01 Certainly
there are other policies at stake-policies relating to human dignity, individual
freedom, free speech, equitable development and sharing of information, wealth,
power, self-determination, public order, national security, and "cultural imperialism"1 02-but continued oppression is the clear result.
IV
PRESENT LEGAL UTILITY OF THE ACT

A.

Freedom to "Know and Act"

As mentioned, the Helsinki Final Act, by merely reaffirming the right of individuals to "know and act," has important legal utility in connection with efforts to
assure widespread enjoyment of human rights. Most Western writers have recognized another important reaffirmation contained in principle VII-the recognition
of "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect
for which is an essential factor for . . . peace, justice and well-being . . . ...As
writers tend uniformly to proclaim, such a recognition constitutes a significant
admission by each participating state that respect for human rights is an international concern and is not within the exclusive province of any particular state
within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter. 10 3 In this sense,
states and other entities also have a right to "know and act."
This is an important reaffirmation, and its utility does not depend upon
whether the principles of the Final Act are legally binding. Indeed, the entire
Helsinki process has helped to further internationalize human concern about state
violations of human rights. It does not matter that the obligations themselves are
100. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 319.
101. See The Propaganda Sweepstakes, TIME, Mar. 9, 1981, at 15.
102. Compare the policies mentioned in Robinson, RegulatinglnternationalAtwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-5, 13, 15, 18-20, 40 n. 120 (1980) with Paust, supra note 2, at 624-30, 648-50 and Cassese,
supra note 3, at 284 (recognizing the relation between free speech and self-determination, and thus principles VII and VIII of the Final Act). Robinson speaks of a "new world information order," Robinson, supra
at 19, 40 n.120, but such may either be continually thwarted by state oppression or will, eventually, override even the most ardent of the oppressive state elites. Indeed, Professor Michael Reisman has recently
warned that the phrase "new world information order" has developed partly into a euphemism for state
elite attempts to control the free flow of information. See Reisman, supra note 35; see generall' 73 PRCc.
AM. SOC. INT'L L. 183 (1979).
103. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMiTT, supra note 14, at 213; J. STARKE,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 400 (8th ed. 1977); Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 7; Cabranes,
supra note 58, at 286; Carliner, supra note 66, at 398; Cassese, supra note 3, at 288-89; Chalidze, supra note
17, at 433; Coughlin, supra note 14, at 512-13; Dimitrijevi6, supra note 3, at 254, 262, 265-67, 270; Fascell,
supra note 21, at 343; Fox, supra note 67; Goldberg, supra note 33, at 318; Goldberg, supra note 14, at 250;
Goldberg & Fay, Human Rights in the Wake of the Helsbzki Accords, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6
(1979); Goldberg, Human Rights-An Issue For Our Time, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 887 (1978); Henkin, supra note
14, at 23; Higgins, supra note 16, at 1, 4-5, 11; Jonathan &Jacqu6,supra note 12, at 51; Kiss & Dominick,
supra note 12, at 301-03; Leary, supra note 14, at 113; Nafziger, supra note 3, at 570; Nimetz, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 90; Oliver, supra note 15, at 34-35; 86; Pechota, supra note 17, at 472-74; Robertson,
supra note 16, at 40-43; Russell, The Helstki Dec/aratlin,supranote 15, at 263; 268; Schneider, 72 PRoC. AM.
SOC. INT'L L. 203 (1978); Turack, supra note 3, at 114; Turack, supra note 14, at 605-06; ILA REPORT, supra
note 16, at 131, 133; Comment, supra note 14, at 137, 147.
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primarily moral or political; what matters is that there has been an internationalization of such human concern. 0 4 This clearly has occurred.
B.

Use as an Interpretive Aid

The fact that the Helsinki Act, whether or not it is a legal document, has contributed to international law by reaffirming human rights and correlative nationstate obligations is generally recognized.' 0 5 Thus, the Final Act can play an
important role by furthering and perhaps reshaping patterns of legal expectation
concerning human rights. It has also been suggested that the Helsinki Act can
play a useful role as an interpretive aid or as evidence of further refined content
06
concerning such human rights matters as transnational speech.'
As explained by Professor Tom Buergenthal, "various provisions of the Helsinki Final Act may be viewed as evidence of the practice of states . . . [and] can
assist in establishing authoritative interpretations of ambiguous international
instruments . . . . 07 Later, he added:
The human rights provisions contained in Basket III. . . are for the most part narrower in
scope and more specific. . . [and] whenever the Basket III provisions are more specific than
those set out in various obligatory international human rights instruments..., the former
may be resorted to by the signatory states to clarify the meaning of the latter, including the
108
intended reach of available defenses, limitations, and escape clauses ....

The problem with this nearly unqualified acceptance of the Final Act as an interpretive aid is that despite the suggestions of such a utility by certain textwriters, a
more broadly based expectation that the Act is, in toto, an authoritative documentation of human rights content is still lacking. Some provisions undoubtedly
mirror human rights law; some are arguably relevant as authoritative interpretive
aids. Are other provisions merely representative of a new "political" or "moral"
will? Do some provisions lack a basis of support in patterns of generally shared
legal expectation? 0 9
There would have to be a better demonstration of actual patterns of acceptance of the Basket III provisions as legally relevant interpretive aids before one
could conclude that the Act is useful as an authort'tat/we guide to content. We may
be close to such an acceptance, especially as private groups increasingly rely on the
104. See, e.g., R. LILLICH & L. NEWMAN, supra note 66, at 5, 37, 67, 864-66; M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & L. CHEN,supra note 3, at 208-15passbm. For a related point, see also Amicus Brief, supra note
87, at 3, 10-12.
105. On this general point, see, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6, 8; Cassese, supra note 16, at 105;
Cassese, supra note 3, at 275; Errera, supra note 58, at 412, 426-27; Frowein,supra note 12, at 72; Jonathan &
Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 45-46, 52; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 304, 306; ILA REPORT, supra note
16, at 128, 130; Nimetz, supra note 15, at 59; Comment, supra note 14, at 137-39, 145; see also Higgins,supra
note 16, at 4, 11.
106. See, e.g., R. LILLICH & L. NEWMAN, supra note 66, at 849 (Kissinger stating that basic principles
of human rights are "in" the Final Act); Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6-9; Cassese, supra note 16, at 10507; Frowein, supra note 12, at 72-77; Jonathan & Jacqu , supra note 12, at 46, 52-53 (sometimes "more
specific" or "adds interesting clarifications"); Russell, The Helsbkzk Declaration, supra note 15, at 248
("viewed . . . as consistent with international law"); Uibopuu, supra note 16, at 224-25; see also Nanda,
Book Review, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 504 (1980).
107. See Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 6-7, summarizing conclusions of a conference.
108. Id at 8-9.
109. See also supra notes 35-39.
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Helsinki provisions in making legal claims. 10 Nevertheless, we do not seem to have
reached such a stage at this time. It may be argued that the United States' amicus
brief in Fi/artiga refutes the last point, but such language may be read restrictively
at present (i.e., "provides evidence" might be read "in part provides evidence" of
customary law)," 1 especially since some of the Basket III provisions proved rela1 2
tively contentious during the conference proceedings.'
Similarly, claims have been made that the Helsinki Final Act estops participating states from denying the legal nature of its provisions. 1 3 But such a claim
ultimately begs the same sort of question. It is an ingenious argument. In this
case, however, permissible reliance in connection with estoppel theory relates best
to a reliance upon foreign state declarations that evidence that state's acceptance
or recognition of some standard as a legal standard.1 14 These claims seek to estop a
foreign state's denial that it is legally bound by certain declarations previously
made concerning legally relevant standards or, more generally, its legal
obligations.
The estoppel claims are not concerned primarily with moral or political obligations as such, although the concept of a "political obligation" raises interesting
questions. Presumably, the Helsinki signators are estopped from denying the
moral and political nature of the obligations assumed in the Final Act. Although
they may not be illusory, 1 5 these obligations rest on a different set of expectations-those regarding the appropriateness of a partial or total noncompliance or
1 16
the consequences of noncompliance, for example.'
For these reasons, it seems more advantageous to stress the legal authoritativeness of the UN Charter human rights obligations and the legally relevant, if not
customary, content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These instruments reflect the human right to transnational freedom of speech. With this in
mind, one can view the Basket III provisions of the Final Act partly as reflecting
110. See, e.g. , Pechota, supra note 17, at 4 79 passim; supra notes 58 and 60.
111. See supra text accompanying note 89.
112. See, e.g., Jonathan & Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 47 ("freedom of information-the most sensitive
subject"), 61 ("differences . . . most pronounced" and still differences in "interpretation and implementation"). Cf id at 65.
113. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 16, at 106-07; Uibopuu, supra note 16, at 225; see also Schachter, supra
note 13, at 301. Both Professors Uibopuu and Cassese seemed to address estoppel only in connection with
the process of self-determination and prior Soviet theories that are thwarting the full meaning of such a
process and its relation to other human rights.
114. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 25-26 (on the need for assumption, acceptance or recognition of a standard as a legal standard); see also id at 41-45 (on the need for
opinio juris); Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 267-68 and (New Zealand v.
France), id at 457, 472-73; Rubin, The InternatznalLegal Efects of UnilateralDeclarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1977).
115. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22. It should also be noted that some "laws" may,
through time, prove to be more "illusory" than political agreements when the pattern of supportive expectations changes. The same point can be made concerning what a lawyer believes to be a legally binding
contract but what a businessperson more realistically considers to be a workable process of agreement that
rests upon mutual but changeable expectations. Similarly, what a technical legal interpreter might classify
as mere "illusory" promises could form the basis of a functional process of agreement that outlasts the most
legally sanctified of contract relationships.
116. Consider, for example, the patterns of expectation involved in a "nonbinding" business
relationship.
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legal content and partly as a demonstrated political will "to proceed to the implementation of" 11 7 legal and political goals and obligations. Indeed, many of the
provisions are couched in implementary language, 118 thus demonstrating what
appears primarily to be a political will to implement.
In this sense, the statement contained in Basket III that the participating states
make it "their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of
all kinds,"' 1 9 or that they intend "in particular. . .[t]o contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications," 120 takes nothing away from the human rights obligations of the UN
Charter, as authoritatively supplemented by the Universal Declaration.' 2 1 Such
statements take nothing away from the legal expectation documented in article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has the right "to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers."' 122 What is sometimes neglected is an adequate implementation of
such a right. The general legal expectation continues that such a right should
have a remedy. 123 Helsinki, in this sense, seeks a more adequate remedy.
Additionally, the authoritativeness of human rights law does not rest on the
consent or lack of consent of any particular state. What is needed in the interna124
tional community is a generally shared expectation, rather than total consent.
Thus, it would not matter that the Soviet Union, as a law violator, did not consent
to an international legal norm. Nor would it matter that the Soviet Union misinterpreted the "necessity within democratic limits" test of permissible restrictions of
free speech 125 and engaged in conduct that was violative of international law. As
suggested by Professor Jochen Frowein, the "escape clauses" are not interpreted in
a final way by a particular state. 126 Rather, they are only provisionally interpreted
127
with the possibility of community review.

117. Basket III, § 1 (Human Contacts), preamble.
118. For example, much of the relevant language of § 2 (Information) reads: "aim to facilitate," "will
encourage," "will facilitate," "will take appropriate measures," "will favour." Id § 2.
119. Id. § 2, preamble.
120. Id § 2(a)(ii). For evidence of different East European practices in this regard, see, e.g., Jonathan
& Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 62.
121. See Paust, supra note 2, at 631; see also supra text accompanying note 12 (quoting principle X of
the Final Act).
122. See supra note 2.
123. See supra note 8.
124. See, e.g., Paust, Comment, supra note 39, and cases cited; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra
note 114, at 41-45.
125. For a detailed consideration of this test, see Paust, supra note 2, at 626-29, 664. Here, it should
also be noted that the overall nature of a state's "political, economic or social system" as such is not a
relevant factor. See also Final Act, supra note 1, preamble; Higgins, supra note 16, at 2.
126. Frowein, supra note 12, at 76-77.
127. See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 218-20
(1961). For recent evidence of the Human Rights Committee's view of a nation-state's "burden of proof"
with regard to alleged violations of the International Covenants, see Commentanes; Human Rights Committee,
REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, Dec. 1980, at 35, 37-38.
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V
FUTURE POTENTIAL

Perhaps the most realistic future legal potential of the Helsinki Final Act
involves its more broadly based acceptance as an interpretive aid. If its authoritativeness as a guide increases, the Final Act might be utilized to provide an
expanded meaning of transnational freedom of speech. Perhaps then, as suggested
by Professor Frowein, it will evidence a more expanded or detailed content that
12
cannot be excluded from the meaning of other human rights instruments.
Here it is assumed that the Final Act will continue to have important legal
effects whether or not it obtains a legal status. The role of the Helsinki process in
stimulating private attitudes and behavior will be particularly important.
Someday there may exist widespread expectations that the entire Final Act exemplifies either customary nation-state obligations or human rights content, or both.
29
But such a customary status is for the future.'
In the meantime, there exists a human right to transnational freedom of
speech-a right partly thwarted by certain state elites, but partly furthered by the
Helsinki process and a revolution in communications technology that may serve
even more effectively than "binding" legal documents to liberate human thought
and communication from oppression by state elites. Against those who choose in
the future to deny such a human right, the "rocks and stones themselves" may also
"start to sing."' 3 0

128. See Frowein, supra note 12, at 76-77.
129. See also Buergentbal, supra note 13, at 6-7; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 315; Russell, The
Hdssnki Declaration, supra note 15, at 248.
130. Hosanna, in jesus Christ Superstar (A. Webber & T, Rice 1970). The full paragraph reads, "Why
waste your breath moaning at the crowd? Nothing can be done to stop the shouting. If every tongue was
...Today the
still the noise would still continue. The rocks and stones themselves would start to sing.
"rocks and stones" can "sing"-when fashioned by human hands into telecommunication satellites and
other media instruments.

